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Goffman’s return to Las Vegas: Studying corruption as social interaction1 
Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that corruption research can benefit from studying corrupt transactions 
as a particular form of social interaction. We showcase the usefulness of a theoretical focus on 
social interaction by investigating online user reports on the website Frontdesktip.com. 
Through this focus, we can observe users sharing experiences and tips on the best ways of 
bribing hotel clerks in Las Vegas for attaining room upgrades and other complimentary 
extras. We employ a logistic regression analysis to examine what factors influence the 
“successful” performance of this bribery practice. Our study makes a twofold contribution to 
existing research on corruption. First, on the theoretical level, we show that the typified and 
scripted character of social interactions can help explain corrupt transactions. Second, on a 
methodological level, our study showcases online self-reports as a useful data source to 
observe corrupt transactions in an unobtrusive way. 
Keywords 
business ethics; bribery; codes of conduct; corruption; online media; social interactions 
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Introduction 
The large-scale Siemens corporate bribery case that erupted in 2006 (Breit, 2010) or the Libor 
price-fixing scandal in 2012 (Konchar, 2014) remind us that corporate forms of corruption 
(i.e. forms of corruption involving business representatives as either the bribe-giver or 
receiver; Argandoña, 2003) continue to be pervasive. Accordingly, a large body of research in 
management and organization studies has been devoted to studying these forms of corruption 
by investigating how anti-corruption policies can be applied more effectively. In their 
extensive review of this literature, Ashforth et al. (2008) argue that existing research tends to 
place the locus of explanation on either one of two levels. On the individual level, scholars 
tend to link corrupt practices to agents’ limited cognitive capacity to grasp the ethical 
dimension of such practices. On the systemic (i.e. organizational or national) level, the 
occurrence of corruption is typically explained by studying the structural conditions that 
facilitate corrupt practices on a larger scale. However, Ashforth et al. (2008) also highlight 
that these two dominant approaches cannot fully explain the occurrence of corruption. The 
authors suggest complementing existing research with theoretical approaches that take into 
account the situational context of corrupt transactions (see also Morales et al., 2014; Rabl, 
2011, 2012), especially in the case of strongly institutionalized practices of corruption where 
“the strength of the situation may overwhelm individual propensities” (Ashforth et al., 2008, 
p. 679).  
The neglect of social-situational factors in theoretical explanations of corruption, 
however, is inherently linked to methodological restrictions. Since the subject matter of 
corruption is rather delicate and is hard to observe directly, most empirical research tends to 
be dominated by relatively indirect (and reactive) forms of data collection, such as surveys or 
interviews (Sequeira, 2012). These methodologies, however, can be criticized for being 
somewhat detached from the actual situational context of corrupt transactions, as researchers 
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typically rely on participants’ perception and recollection of corrupt transactions. As Sequeira 
(2012) argues, observing corruption more directly on the transaction level would offer a 
“great promise to enable scholars to test more specific theories of the micro-dynamics of 
corrupt behavior” (Sequeira, 2012, p. 167). 
In this paper, we address the conceptual and methodological shortcomings in 
corruption research by drawing on theories of social interaction (e.g., Barley and Tolbert, 
1997; Clair et al., 2005; Goffman, 1955, 1963). These theories highlight that social 
interactions tend to follow a “scripted” pattern (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), even if they 
involve individual actors that are previously unknown to each other. Barley and Tolbert 
(1997) define scripts as “observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction 
characteristic of a particular [social] setting” (p. 98). As such, scripts can help overcome the 
inherent uncertainty that is characteristic to social interactions (Gomez and Jones, 2000). In 
this paper, we demonstrate the usefulness of the social interaction lens by investigating online 
self-reports of bribery practices on the website Frontdesktip.com. On this website, users share 
their experiences and tips on the best methods of bribing hotel clerks in Las Vegas, Nevada 
(USA) in order to get a room upgrade or other complimentary extras. This practice is 
colloquially referred to as the “$20 sandwich trick.” According to Frontdesktip.com, the trick 
involves “sandwiching” a $20-dollar bill between the documents (e.g., the driver’s license and 
the credit card which the hotel guest hands to the receptionist) and simultaneously indicating 
that the guest would like to receive a free room upgrade. As we will argue further below, the 
trick represents an ethically questionable practice that can be interpreted as a particular form 
of corruption (i.e. a so-called “bribery-tip”; sees Azar, 2007). We understand corruption more 
generally as the “misuse of an organizational position or authority for personal gain or 
organizational (or sub-unit) gain” (Anand et al., 2004, p. 40). The self-reports on 
Frontdesktip.com provide us with a rare opportunity to observe corrupt practices at the 
transaction level and in their actual situational context. Based on a logistic regression model, 
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we investigate which factors influence whether or not the practice of bribery is “successful,” 
in the sense that it enables the hotel guest to get a “free” room upgrade. Our findings suggest 
that the interaction itself and its “scripted” character (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) can help 
explain the “successful” attempts of the practice described as playing the sandwich trick. 
 This study makes a twofold contribution to the existing literature on corruption. First, 
on the theoretical level, we extend existing theoretical explanations of what determines the 
“success” of corrupt transactions by shifting the locus of explanation to the social interaction 
itself.  Based on our empirical study of the “$20 sandwich trick”, we demonstrate that this 
particular bribery practice gets stabilized and patterned as a social interaction through 
individual actors’ attempts of avoiding the stigmatized and the sanctionable nature of corrupt 
transactions. Second, on the methodological level, our study shows the usefulness of online 
self-reports as a data source to empirically study corruption on the transaction level. In turn, 
online self-reports, while keeping in mind their methodological limitations (e.g., self-selection 
biases) can open up promising pathways to study the “natural” occurrence of corrupt 
transactions in an unobtrusive way. 
Conceptual shortcomings of corruption research:  
Neglecting the explanatory power of social interactions 
Research on corruption has been growing steadily over the past decades and encompasses 
various academic disciplines such as organization and management studies (e.g., Ashforth et 
al., 2008), economics (e.g., Sequeira, 2012), or (political) anthropology and sociology (e.g., 
Torsello and Venard, 2016). Ashforth et al. (2008) identify two dominant modes of 
explanation for the occurrence of corruption. The authors mobilize the proverbial “one bad 
apple spoils the barrel” to explain that extant works attribute the cause of corruption either to 
“bad apples” (i.e. flawed individuals) or “bad barrels” (i.e. flawed systemic structures). 
Studies following the “bad apples approach” generally ascribe the locus of explanation to 
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individual agents and their egoistic motives and/or limited capacities to comprehend the moral 
dimension of corrupt practices in certain situations (e.g., Butterfield et al., 2000; Weber and 
Wasieleski, 2001). Research following the “bad barrel” approach tends to place the locus of 
explanation on the structural or systemic level instead, for instance, by investigating 
institutionalized structures in certain organizational or national contexts that make the 
occurrence of corrupt practices more likely (e.g., Kulik et al., 2008; Toffler, 2003).  
Ashforth et al. (2008, p. 679), however, go on to argue that extant corruption research 
simultaneously neglects other forms of explanation. For example, social-situational factors 
that are neither individual nor organizational-systemic in character can provide stability to 
corrupt practices nevertheless (see also Jancsics, 2014). The overemphasis in corruption 
research on either an individual or systemic level is also visible in more specific research on 
forms of corruption, such as in research on employee fraud (see Dorminey et al., 2012). 
Within this literature, a large stream of research tends to rely on the classical “fraud triangle” 
model which dates back to Cressey (1953; for a genealogical overview of the concept, see 
Morales et al., 2014). The fraud triangle model aims to explain the occurrence of employee 
fraud through three dimensions: (1) motivation/pressure, (2) opportunity, and (3) 
attitude/rationalization.  
In the fraud triangle model, all three dimensions take the vantage point in the corrupt 
individual actor (see also the “bad apple” approach, as described by Ashforth et al., 2008). In 
other words, the model implies a “vision of fraud being caused by morally deviant 
individuals” (Morales et al., 2014, p. 190). From this angle, individual actors are likely to 
engage in corrupt transactions when (1) they are motivated or feel pressure to do so, (2) when 
they see the opportunity to do so without being sanctioned, and (3) when they find a way of 
rationalizing the corrupt practice as harmless or as the “common way of doing things.” These 
three dimensions share the premise that the locus of explanation lies in the ways of how 
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individual actors relate to and enact organizational-systemic conditions, such as perceiving 
the latter as pressures, opportunities, or as means of rationalization. Morales et al. (2014) 
conclude that the fraud triangle model “promotes a vision of fraud anchored in both the 
individual and organization, while downplaying the social, political and cultural explanations 
for fraud” (p. 190). We use the assessment by Morales et al. (2014) as the starting point for 
developing our line of reasoning that corruption research can strongly benefit from focusing 
on the patterned and scripted character of corrupt transactions as social interactions (see 
Warburton, 2001; Jancsics, 2013, 2014). However, we argue that the lack of explanatory 
focus on social interactions is closely linked to methodological shortcomings in corruption 
research, as we will elaborate in the next section. 
Methodological challenges of studying corrupt transactions in their situational context 
Due to the delicate and covert nature of corruption as an empirical phenomenon, researchers 
naturally face challenges when it comes to directly observing instances of corruption in their 
actual social-situational context (Cole and Tran, 2011). One consequence of this complication 
is that indirect and reactive modes of data collection prevail in this research area (see 
Sequeira, 2012). Accordingly, a large part of research on corruption tends to rely primarily on 
survey-based methodologies (e.g., Halter et al., 2009; Venard, 2009; Venard and Hanafi, 
2008). For instance, Transparency International’s widely used “Corruption Perceptions Index” 
(Davis and Ruhe, 2003) is based on perceptions of corrupt behavior as reported in 
questionnaires. This index forms the basis of a substantial number of cross-country studies on 
corruption (e.g., Getz and Volkema, 2001; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). However, scholars 
have recently expressed doubts about the ability of respondents to identify and reliably assess 
and report corrupt behavior (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2006; Sequeira, 2012). Moreover, survey-based 
corruption research is often beset by the social desirability bias leading to the tendency of 
respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed positively by third parties 
(Bernardi et al., 2003).  
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Recently, corruption research has moved towards more direct—even if still reactive—
forms of studying corruption. In this context, we can distinguish two main research traditions 
that have advanced a more direct observability of corrupt behavior. First, studies from the 
field of economics have made laudable efforts in employing more direct methodologies. For 
example, Cole and Tran (2011) argue a more thorough observation of corruption can be 
accomplished by collecting data on documented bribe payments from internal records of 
business firms. Studies from the behavioral economics tradition that investigate corrupt 
behavior in laboratory experiments provide an even closer direct observation of corrupt 
transactions. For instance, Rabl (2011) examined in a laboratory setting how situational 
variables (such as the amount of a bribe, time pressure, or the degree of abstractness or 
concreteness in a code of conduct) influence whether or not an individual accepts a bribe 
offer. However, while such studies make it possible to observe empirically corrupt 
transactions at the micro-level, the external validity and the generalizability of their findings 
from the lab to real-world settings is questionable. Such shortcomings are tackled, in turn, by 
other innovative studies within the behavioral economics tradition that are based on field 
experiments (e.g., Armantier and Boly, 2011; Bertrand et al., 2007) or other forms of field 
observations. For example, Olken and Barron (2009) “shadowed” truck drivers who regularly 
had to give bribes to pass access-controlled areas in the Aceh region of Indonesia. This 
research involved sitting next to truck drivers in the cabin and observing their behavior when 
passing each control post. This study allowed the researchers to understand the complex pric-
ing schemes that various officials, such as police officers and customs officials, apply in the 
context of bribery. 
A second stream of research that employs more direct forms of studying corruption 
stems from social anthropology (for a recent overview, see Torsello and Venard, 2016). 
These studies usually adopt qualitative methodologies, such as ethnographic research, in order 
to gain an in-depth understanding of cultures of corruption that are prevalent in certain 
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national or organizational settings. However, most of these studies explore corruption in 
developing countries (e.g., Blundo, 2007; Blundo and de Sardan, 2006) and thus cannot fully 
explain the occurrence of corruption in developed countries, especially in corporate contexts 
(Aragonda, 2003). 
Overall, we acknowledge the important steps that have been made over the past years 
towards making more direct observations of corrupt practices possible, especially in those 
streams of the literature that are based on experiments or ethnographies. However, many of 
these methodologies furthermore raise the problem of reactivity.  In other words, 
ethnographic studies, surveys, interviews, participant observations, or field experiments, have 
the inherent tendency of influencing the very subject matter they seek to study, thus producing 
inaccurate or even artifactual accounts of social reality (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
While it is hard to determine precisely the amount of such biases (and in some settings they 
might even be negligible), relying on methods that avoid direct interferences with the study 
subject is the best way to avoid this type of inaccuracies. Accordingly, we argue that research 
on corruption can benefit from unobtrusive methodologies that allow for approximating actual 
instances of corruption without causing such reactivity. 
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Theoretical perspective: Studying corrupt transactions through a social interaction lens 
In order to more thoroughly address the conceptual and methodological shortcomings in 
corruption research, as identified above, we explain the occurrence of corrupt transactions by 
conceptualizing them as a specific form of social interaction. As Warburton (2001) notes: 
“Corrupt transactions occur between actors as the result of social interaction. For corrupt 
transactions to occur there must be communication between two or more individuals” (p. 
222). Research on social interactions has a long-standing history in sociology and social 
psychology, particularly in the tradition of the classical works by sociologist Erving Goffman 
(e.g., Clair et al., 2005; Goffman, 1955, 1963). Research from a social interaction perspective 
has been influential in organization and management studies more generally, as well (e.g., 
Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Clair et al., 2005; Seidl, 2005). 
While social interactions in principle give participants some room for maneuvering 
(Luhmann, 1992; Seidl, 2005), they nevertheless tend to follow a strongly patterned, 
“ritualized” or “scripted” character, at the same time (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). This links 
back to the works of Goffman on social interactions: “Whenever the physical possibility of 
spoken interactions arises, it seems that a system of practices, conventions, and procedural 
rules comes into play which functions as a means of guiding and organizing the flow of 
messages” (Goffman, 1955, p. 239). The need to learn what actions are appropriate in certain 
social situations and in what order is especially pronounced in social interactions amongst 
unknown participants (e.g., a job interview or the first dinner with potential in-laws). Such 
shared typifications have an important orientation function and help individual actors to 
overcome the “pervasive uncertainty with respect to the actions and expectations of other 
actors” (Jagd, 2007, p. 78). Furthermore, theories of social interactions shed light on the self-
legitimizing character of social interactions in order to explain their institutionalization. In 
other words, the successful performance and recurrence of a social interaction typically 
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fosters its own legitimacy and justification (see Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p. 94; Gomez and 
Jones, 2000, p. 702).  
 In a next step, we discuss the characteristics of corrupt transactions as a particular 
form of social interaction. First, corrupt transactions tend to involve face-to-face interactions, 
at least when the transaction participants make their initial contact: “[…] corrupt approaches 
are usually made in face to face meetings where as much non-verbal information can be 
conveyed and received in what is a highly complex social interaction” (Warburton, 2001, p. 
225; see also Olken and Barron, 2009). Second, while the face-to-face character of corrupt 
transactions helps participants ensure mutual trust and reciprocity, the participants always 
face the risk of social sanctionability and stigma (e.g., through observation by third parties or 
whistleblowing; see Lambsdorff and Frank, 2011). This, in turn, creates the necessity of 
secrecy during corrupt transactions: “Corrupt transactions are by definition sanctionable. If 
they are sanctionable, whether legally or otherwise, those that participate in them know they 
must keep such participation secret from others” (Warburton, 2001, p. 224). Hence, the 
question arises how do individual actors ensure the occurrence of “successful” corrupt 
transactions and overcome the risk of sanctionability and stigmatization. 
 Based on the insights by Goffman (1955; 1963) and his followers (e.g., Clair et al., 
2005), we can identify three generic strategies of stigma avoidance in social interactions that 
are applicable to the specific case of corrupt transactions. (1) The primary route to avoid 
social stigma is to closely follow the “scripted” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) character of social 
interactions. In the particular context of corrupt transactions, the necessity to “follow the 
script” is closely linked to the stigma avoidance strategy of concealment (Goffman, 1963). 
Case in point, through the use of a cover, the initiator of a corrupt transaction can signal to 
their counterpart that they are familiar with the “rules of the game.” In this regard, a corrupt 
transaction creates “[…] the need for corrupt agents to learn a specific linguistic code, a com-
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mon jargon, that better allows them to better camouflage their illegal dealings” (Della Porta 
and Vannucci, 2012, p. 236). (2) Another strategy of stigma avoidance is called passing 
(Goffman, 1963), which means to attach a sanctionable practice to another, more favorable 
attribute. In the context of corruption, this may involve reframing a corrupt transaction as 
facilitation payment (Argandoña, 2005), tip (Azar, 2007), or linking the reason for giving a 
bribe to other (harmless) attributes in the aim to evoke “altruistic” forms of corruption 
(Hollinger et al., 1992; Simmons, 1999). (3) A third strategy of stigma avoidance is the 
proactive relationship management by means of socializing or bonding (Goffman, 1963). This 
strategy aims at establishing a strong bond amongst a small group of confidants. This may 
involve small talk or gossiping. In the context of corruption, strategies like this have been 
described by Jancsics (2013) as a form of a “mating dance” in which transaction partners first 
engage in an informal social interaction to seek out each other’s motives and trustworthiness 
before the actual corrupt transaction takes place.  
In the next three sections, we first outline the rather special case context of our 
empirical study. Second, we describe the methodological approach we have employed. Third, 
we present the findings of our empirical study. 
The “$20 sandwich trick” 
Case context  
In this study, we investigate corrupt transactions as social interactions by exploiting self-
disclosure in online media as a new and potentially rich data source. New forms of user-
generated online media, especially social media (e.g., Facebook, forums, or weblogs), provide 
platforms on which users can write, often anonymously, about ethically questionable business 
practices, either to apportion blame, or as “whistleblowers,” or to boast of one's prowess, or 
simply for pragmatic reasons, such as sharing their experiences. These web-based platforms 
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create new forms of transparency that make it possible to observe practices that were 
previously unobservable (Crowley, 2012). 
As Argandona (2005) argued, management and organization scholars tend to focus 
primarily on cases of “grand” or large-scale corruption while overlooking small-scale and 
mundane “petty” forms of corruption or ethical transgressions. In order to illuminate and 
further explore our theoretical considerations, we chose to study petty forms of corruption in 
the context of the practice known as the “$20 sandwich trick”, as made visible by the website 
Frontdesktip.com (and related websites such as Twentydollartrick.com or 
Vegasmessageboards.com). On Frontdesktip.com, users share their experiences about how 
and where in Las Vegas, Nevada (USA), one can get a hotel upgrade for a comparably small 
“tip” of $20. In the common variant of the trick, hotel guests place a $20 bill between their 
credit card and their ID or driver’s license, hand the “sandwich” to the receptionist at check-in 
and simultaneously request a complimentary upgrade. If the receptionist spots the money and 
understands its tacit purpose, they will typically pocket the “tip” and try to upgrade the 
booking or at least provide the guest with extras that were not purchased. In our dataset, the 
sandwich trick fails in 22 percent of the reported trials. Here is one example of a user report of 
a “successful” trial of the “sandwich trick” at Frontdesktip.com: 
 
The strength of this dataset, as we believe, lies in providing us with a large number of 
descriptions of a corrupt practice at the transaction level, including further contextual 
information on the social interaction between the bribe-giver (the hotel guest) and the bribe-
receiver (the hotel clerk). Furthermore, the publicly available dataset has advantages in 
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allowing for an unobtrusive investigation of user reports of small-scale corruption and for 
studying the success of certain patterns of interaction. Datasets like this, i.e. which allow for a 
peek through the keyhole into corruption as social interactions, can help tackle both the 
theoretical and the methodological shortcomings in corruption research, as identified above. 
Tip or bribe? 
There are several reasons for considering the “$20 sandwich trick” as an act of bribery, rather 
than as a normal, legal and socially acceptable form of tipping. Below, we outline the five 
most important indications of bribery in this case:  
Prospective payment. The customer typically hands the “sandwich” to the hotel clerk before 
receiving the service or upgrade. Torfason et al. (2013) argue that retrospective payments 
intended to reward good service, i.e. when the gratuity follows the rendering of a service, 
ought to be considered an acceptable form of tipping; in contrast, prospective tipping, or when 
the gratuity precedes the rendering of a service, tends to be regarded as a form of bribery.  
Expectation of direct reciprocity. The payment of the $20 for a prospective service implies an 
expectation of direct reciprocity. That is, hotel guests hope to receive an upgrade to a better 
hotel room or other extras that are normally paid for in return for their generosity. However, 
this practice stands in stark contrast to the established practice of retrospective tipping: “a true 
tip does not involve immediate reciprocity” (Udoidem, 1987, p. 616). 
Hidden performance. Usually, the hotel guest hands the money to the receptionist covertly. 
This is a strong indication that hotel guests are at least uncertain as to whether their act is 
ethically sound or not. This ethical uncertainty is also evident in the comments of several user 
reports on Frontdesktip.com—here are two examples from our data (own emphases added): 
The clerk spotted the cash immediately and promptly removed it and stuck it in plain 
view on top of the counter [...]. I got the distinct feeling that her deliberate placement of 
the bill in such plain view and in such a quick fashion was her way of telling me “this is 
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not going to happen and I want nothing to do with this money.” (Statement by hotel guest 
on Frontdesktip.com) 
It’s better to start a conversation that will make the worker comfortable with helping you 
[…]; the $20 sandwich can give the wrong idea (bribe?) and blow any chance of an 
upgrade. (Statement by hotel guest on Frontdesktip.com) 
Violation of fiduciary duties. Typically, Frontdesktip.com users report that most hotel 
receptionists tend to put the money directly in their pockets. Therefore, we can presume that 
in these cases neither their employers nor the tax authorities have received a share of the 
money. In line with James (2002), we argue that such cases can be seen as a direct violation 
of the fiduciary duties that an agent (in this case, the receptionist or his or her supervisors) has 
towards the principal (in this case, the hotel owners). As James (2002, p. 211) concludes, if 
the agent pockets the money or is unwilling to write a receipt, then “it is, by definition, a bribe 
and therefore, by definition, unethical.” This echoes Azar’s notion of “bribery-tipping:” 
Generally, I categorize tips in advance as bribery-tipping when someone else (either 
other consumers or the employer) is hurt as a result of what the worker does, and as 
tipping-in-advance otherwise. […] Bribery-tipping is paying for something that is 
socially undesirable: getting [preferential] treatment without justification at the expense 
of others. (Azar, 2007, p. 258)  
Azar (2007, p. 259) explicitly uses the example of paying hotel staff informally a small sum 
in exchange for a free room upgrade to illustrate the practice of bribery-tipping:  
Another example for bribery-tipping in which the employer is hurt rather than other 
customers is when a guest tips the reservation manager to get a free upgrade of a hotel 
room. The owner of the hotel would prefer to sell the better room for a higher price rather 
than giving it as a free upgrade, and is hurt by the tipping transaction. As with other cases 
of bribery, both the giver and the taker (the consumer and the worker) can be blamed.  
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The Frontdesktip.com user reports provide mixed evidence on whether the trick is generally 
tolerated or not by different hotel managements. The next two examples from our data 
indicate that at least some Las Vegas hotel owners do not tolerate the “sandwich trick” (own 
emphases added): 
Please do not refer to clerks by name or description. We will get fired at worst, and stop 
accepting tips at best. We like to accommodate guests, but please don’t blow it for us by 
disclosing our identity on this site. (Statement by receptionist on Frontdesktip.com) 
I know another check in guy at [hotel name], he told me if they are caught taking a $20 
from a sandwich and then upgrading a guest, they will get fired. If they upgrade a guest 
and then the guest hands them a $20 and say's “thank you for the great service” it is ok. 
(Statement by hotel guest on the website Vegasmessageboards.com) 
Nevertheless, even if hotel managers and direct supervisors may tolerate this practice in some 
instances, the employees who receive the bribe, and any potentially complacent managers, 
still violate their fiduciary duty towards the hotel owners and shareholders. This 
argumentation can be further expanded by drawing on the ethical considerations by Heath 
(2006). In this view, the participants in corrupt transactions also tend to violate their 
responsibility vis-à-vis society at large and the more general well-functioning of markets. In 
other words, the practice of “bribery-tipping” (Azar, 2007) lets one of the fundamental values 
erode that make capital markets possible; that is, the belief that agents will act in accordance 
with what principals want. 
Dissemination of the practice. A possible objection to the classification of the “$20 sandwich 
trick” as bribery is that this practice may be acceptable within the bounds of the specific Las 
Vegas context. In other words, hotel owners might tolerate the practice of clerks’ offering free 
upgrades for hotel rooms on the grounds that hotel guests may spend more on gaming and 
thus the owners might benefit from increased casino revenues (Petrillose and Brewer, 2012). 
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However, while the user reports on Frontdesktip.com concern only Las Vegas hotels, there is 
evidence that recently this practice started to spread beyond “Sin City.” For instance, we can 
find reports that people now use this trick successfully in hotels located in other US cities as 
well as getting upgrades when renting a car (e.g., see the website Thetwentydollartrick.com). 
In line with Azar (2007), we classify the “$20 sandwich trick” as a form of “bribery-
tipping” and as such as an ethically questionable practice. We argue that the user reports on 
Frontdesktip.com are a particularly valuable data source for corruption researchers, as the 
individual who takes the less ethically questionable decision, i.e. the hotel guest using the 
trick, is the one who reports on Frontdesktip.com about the success or failure of their trial. 
This setup reduces to a large extent the problem of social desirability often tied to studying 
corruption at the transaction level because at the point of decision making, the receptionist 
does not know if this particular guest will later put a report on Frontdesktip.com. We also 
assume that there is no incentive for guests to under-report or over-report successes because 
we cannot see any strong benefit from such behavior. Consequently, we believe that the main 
variable of interest in our study, i.e. the trick’s success as a reflection of individuals’ bribe-
giving and bribe-taking behaviors, is comparably reliable.  
Methodology 
Dataset and Sample  
In this study, we examine which factors determine the success of the “$20 sandwich trick” as 
a corrupt social interaction (so-called “bribery-tipping”; Azar, 2007). Our dataset consists of 
self-reported descriptions of the “sandwich trick” which involves covertly handing money to 
hotel staff and at the same time asking for a complimentary hotel room upgrade during check-
in as self-reported on Frontdesktip.com. This website can be considered as the main site for 
describing the “sandwich trick” and presents user reports in a standardized format. 
Specifically, these user reports typically contain some information on when and at which 
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hotel the trick was tried, as well as on the success or failure of the “trick.” Furthermore, most 
entries indicate the hotel employee’s gender and estimated age, as well as the category of 
room that was initially booked and the category of room the guest was upgraded to, if at all. 
The raw dataset contained 1,229 observations. Having excluded observations with incomplete 
data, we ended up with a final dataset of 886 “sandwich trick” attempts. 
Methodological Approach 
Our dataset provides us with a rare opportunity to study a corrupt practice at the transaction 
level (see also Sequeira, 2012). Furthermore, the high number of observations enables us to 
employ (logistic) regression analyses in order to examine what factors can best explain the 
trick’s “success.” However, at the same time, there is a shortcoming of empirical research and 
direct observations on corrupt transactions and especially the practices of “bribery-tipping” 
(Azar, 2007) as social interactions, thus far. Therefore, we ascertain that the empirical 
phenomenon requires an exploratory approach that not only includes deductive but also 
inductive modes of reasoning (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). This methodological approach is 
in line with our theoretical focus on the situational context of corrupt transactions as an 
explanatory factor for their “success.” Hence, our approach requires distilling explanatory 
factors for the model inductively, i.e. based on the empirical material at hand (what Ketokivi 
and Mantere, 2010, call “contextualization”). In this regard, our study aligns with prior works 
that have combined exploratory approaches with regression analyses (e.g., Clark and Allen, 
2004; Jex and Gudanowski, 1992; Martinez and Williams, 2014). 
In line with these considerations, we have opted for what is called an “abductive” 
research strategy. Abduction involves back-and-forth movements between a (theoretical) 
body of knowledge and an (empirically) observed phenomenon (Vásquez et al., 2016). This 
research strategy is also known as “inference to the best explanation” or, in short, IBE: “In 
IBE the researcher selects the ‘best’ out of a short list of plausible explanations based on 
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considerations of epistemic virtues, such as simplicity or novelty” (Ketokivi and Mantere, 
2010, p. 319). We followed the research strategy of abduction to develop a theoretical model 
to explain the “success” of the $20 sandwich trick. Abduction seemed most appropriate as it 
combines data-driven, inductive reasoning (based on variables that are derived from the 
situational context of this specific corrupt transaction) with theory-driven, deductive 
reasoning (e.g., the stigma avoidance strategies by Goffman, 1963, or the fraud triangle model 
by Cressey, 1953) in an iterative way.  
Dependent Variable 
In line with our research question, the main dependent variable is the “success” of the 
“sandwich trick.” It takes the value 1 if the outcome was successful and resulted in a 
complimentary room upgrade (or other additional complimentary services), and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
Our abductive research strategy led to the inclusion of three sets of variables within our 
logistic regression model (plus a number of control variables). The first two sets of variables 
are in line with established studies of corruption by covering two dimensions of the classical 
Fraud Triangle model (Cressey, 1953; Morales et al., 2014): variables of motivation and 
variables of opportunity. While the fraud triangle model includes individual actors’ 
rationalizations as the third dimension of the triangle, our analytical model represents a 
social-interaction-focused modification of the model (see also Morales et al., 2014). In 
particular, we assume that the locus of rationalizations and legitimations lies within the social 
interaction itself (see also Gomez and Jones, 2000). In line with this theoretical focus, we 
have inductively generated a third set of variables that captures the specificities of the 
“sandwich trick” as a social interaction in order to shed new light on the rationalization 
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dimension. In the following, we describe the operationalization and measurement of the three 
sets of variables as well as the control variables in more detail.  
(1) Variables on Motivation 
Tip Size. In line with earlier studies on corrupt transactions (e.g., Rabl, 2011, 2012; Svensson, 
2003), we include the size of the bribe as one key factor of motivation. On the one hand, one 
can assume that a higher bribe is more attractive for the recipient of the bribe and thus would 
serve as a motivating factor (Svensson, 2003). On the other hand, the relation between the 
size of the bribe and the success of the corrupt transaction may be non-linear and may equal 
an inverted U-shaped form instead. This is because, as Rabl (2012) asserts, “[c]orruption 
involving high bribes is judged as more unethical than corruption involving low bribes” (p. 
13). In our data, the precise amount of the tip varied slightly. To capture these variations we 
introduced the variable tip size, which indicates in US dollars the precise amount that was 
used in an attempt to play the trick. If no amount was specified, we assumed the tip to be $20, 
given that this was the established and recommended amount used in the “sandwich trick.”  
Unemployment rate. As a further factor that may influence the hotel clerks’ willingness to 
accept small bribes, we coded the average monthly unemployment rates in Las Vegas (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2013). In our study, the average unemployment rates are used (as similarly 
done by other corruption studies such as Mocan, 2008, or Svensson, 2003) to cover the 
specific economic conditions at the time of the visitor’s stay in Las Vegas and serve as a 
proxy for the risk associated with accepting the $20 “tip.” Increased unemployment rates are 
expected to influence the trick’s probability of success negatively in that they lower the 
motivation of an employee to risk potential punishments, in particular losing one’s job, for 
accepting such bribes. Nonetheless, a competing line of explanation could be to assume that 
high unemployment rates combined with a tense job market can also serve as motivation for 
hotel clerks to pocket as much money as possible.  
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(2) Variables on Opportunity 
As a second set, we include variables that capture the dimension of opportunity. In the context 
of our study, the opportunity dimension relates to the hotel clerks’ presumed degree of 
discretion in giving a complimentary upgrade when accepting the $20 tip. 
Room Occupancy. We coded the average monthly room occupancy rate in Las Vegas hotels 
(as provided by the website HVS, 2012) in order to capture whether or not rooms are scarce at 
specific points in time. This in turn, may negatively affect the likelihood of the trick’s 
success. 
Peak Day. We also coded a set of variables that captured the conditions in which the hotel 
clerk was operating at the time the guest checked in. For example, we recorded whether the 
guest checked in on a peak day. The peak day takes the value of 1 if the check-in date falls on 
a Friday or Saturday which are usually the busiest nights in the Las Vegas hotel business.  
Check-In Time. We also included dummies for the check-in timeslot, i.e. morning (6 a.m. to 
noon), afternoon (noon to 4 p.m.), late afternoon/early evening (4 p.m. to 8 p.m.), or late 
evening (after 8 p.m.). We used the late evening check-in as our reference category. The 
check-in timeslot provides us with some information on room availability and thus may have 
a bearing on the trick’s success. Our argument is that most guests who are arriving in the 
morning hours may enjoy a larger flexibility of the hotel employee carrying out upgrades and 
thus have higher chances of being successful.  
Specificity of the Code of Conduct. Finally, we include in the set of opportunity-related 
variables the degree of organizational control. While we lack systematic information (except 
from anecdotal evidence in the reports on Frontdesktip.com) about the degree to which hotel 
managers try to inhibit the $20 sandwich trick practice, we were able to collect the codes of 
conduct of some hotels in the dataset that is, in case they were accessible online. At some 
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hotels, the code of conduct specifies the amount of money that is considered unacceptable and 
states that even small amounts of money could be potentially considered a bribe. We used a 
dummy variable to capture the specificity of codes of conduct with a value of 1 denoting that 
even small amounts of money are mentioned as ethically problematic. The inclusion of this 
variable is in line with earlier studies on corrupt transactions which have measured the degree 
of abstractness or specificity of the code of conduct (e.g., Halter et al., 2009; Rabl, 2011). 
(3) Rationalization Through the Social Interaction 
To capture social interactions, we included in our model variables that cover the actions and 
selections made by the participants in the social encounter in the “sender” role (i.e. the hotel 
guest as bribe-giver) or in the “receiver” role (i.e. the hotel clerk as bribe-receiver).     
Interaction role of the bribe-giver. To cover the “sender” or “bribe-giver” side of the social 
interaction, we included variables that cover to what extent hotel guests followed the scripted 
“standard procedure” of the trick (as described on Frontdesktip.com). In turn, the standard 
procedure comprises of two main elements: (1) A covert hand-over of the bribe (i.e. the 
“sandwich”); and, (2) when handing over the “sandwich,” asking the hotel clerk the standard 
question (as recommended on Frontdesktip.com): “Would you have any complimentary room 
upgrade available?” In the following, we describe in more detail how these two elements of 
the social interaction entered our model. 
Open hand-over. We used a dummy variable to keep track of whether the money was reported 
as handed over to the hotel clerk covertly (0), or as described in the standard procedure of the 
trick, openly (1). 
Congruence with the standard question. Furthermore, we captured the information conveyed 
by the guest to the hotel staff during check-in. We decided to do so because hotel guests often 
deviated from asking the standard question (or added further information), presumably in the 
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hopes that this would increase the probability of the trick’s success. Interestingly, these 
different variants of playing the trick also exhibit similarities to the stigma avoidance 
strategies by Goffman (1963) described previously. Overall, we coded four different variants 
of the guests’ key question: 
(1) Standard question. Straight away, the guest asks hotel staff about the possibility of a 
free upgrade, as Frontdesktip.com recommends. This standard variant of “playing the 
trick” is similar to what Jancsics (2013) has described as the communication strategy 
of “ask it openly” (in his study of corrupt transactions in the former Soviet Union 
countries). This variant is our reference category.  
(2) Small talk and politeness (stigma avoidance strategy of bonding). In this variant of 
“playing the trick,” the guest is especially polite and engages in prolonged small talk 
before asking about the possibility of a free upgrade. We can assume that the hotel 
guest engages in small talk with the aim of establishing a close emotional connection 
with the hotel clerk. This modification of the “sandwich trick” exhibits similarities to 
what Goffman (1963) had described as the stigma avoidance strategy of “bonding.” 
Furthermore, it links back to what Jancsics (2013) described as the “mating dance” 
that is common to corrupt transactions.   
(3) Special occasion (passing). Many hotel guests seem to believe that their chance of 
getting an upgrade increases if they claim they are celebrating a special occasion, such 
as their honeymoon, wedding anniversary, birthday, graduation and so on. This belief 
reflects the assumption that hotel employees will find it easier to justify the upgrade to 
their supervisors due to a special occasion. This variant of “playing the trick” exhibits 
similarities to the stigma avoidance strategy of “passing” (Clair et al., 2005; Goffman, 
1963) in that it includes reframing the corrupt transaction as a form of altruism 
(Hollinger et al., 1992; Simmons, 1999).  
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(4) “Silent” handover (concealment). Some hotel guests did not pose any questions to 
staff but simply handed the hidden tip as described above in a “silent” way. The guests 
seemed to assume that, since the trick is so well known, as soon as the hotel clerk 
discovered the hidden money, they would know why it had been offered in the first 
place and act accordingly. This variant of ”playing the trick” comes closest to the 
stigma avoidance strategy of “concealment” (Clair et al., 2005; Goffman, 1963). We 
deem the successful application of this strategy as the strongest indication for the 
“scripted” character (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) of the sandwich trick as a social 
interaction because it requires that both interaction partners are aware of the typical 
performance of the trick and silently agree on the transaction, i.e. without that the 
utterance of verbal information being necessary. 
In order to facilitate the subsequent statistical analysis we created dummy variables for each 
of the four question types described above. As mentioned previously, the standard question is 
our reference category and hence its dummy has been excluded from the estimations.   
Interaction role of the bribe-receiver. Furthermore, to reflect the (bribe-) receiver side of the 
social interaction, we included two dummy variables that capture the extent to which the hotel 
clerk interpreted the trick correctly. The first variable, unfamiliarity with the trick, measures 
whether the employee was familiar (0) or unfamiliar (1) with the trick, according to the hotel 
guest’s report of the transaction. The variable was coded 1 when there was a clear indication 
in the report that the employee claimed or behaved in a way signaling that he did not know 
the trick (see this example from our data: “A foreign clerk, she did not know what the $20 
was for, I asked for upgrade she said no, I’m on camera. She was very confused. Did not work 
at all”). The second variable, desk money, took the value of 1 if the hotel clerk placed the 
money in plain sight on the desk while completing the check-in, which indicates that the 
attempt at bribery has been either misunderstood or rejected. 
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(4) Controls 
Finally, we coded a set of control variables, such as the gender of the hotel clerk and guest. 
While users on Frontdesktip.com do not indicate their gender explicitly, the headlines of the 
entries state for example “Jackpot! Jim got an upgrade at Bellagio.” From the name, we 
derived a judgment about the gender (wherever possible). While we agree that this is not the 
most precise measure, we believe we were able to code the gender of the guest fairly 
accurately from this information. While the gender of the guest variable was not used in the 
final model, we did use this information to compute a dummy variable that indicated gender 
congruence between employee and guest. We also recorded the age of the hotel employee as 
estimated by the hotel guest. One assumption is that older individuals might be less dependent 
on extra money and take their fiduciary duties more seriously than younger employees would 
take. Thus, we reason that the trick’s success rates may depend on the age of the employee. 
Finally, we controlled for hotel quality (measured in hotel stars and average minimum price 
per night per hotel, as recorded by the website Vegas.com) and hotel size (number of rooms).  
Higher hotel quality may point towards stricter rules and stronger enforcement mechanisms 
and thus might affect the success rate negatively. In contrast, hotel size is linked to the 
availability of potential upgrades and thus relevant in our context, as well. The above 
rationales for the inclusion of control variables are in line with recommendations by Bernerth 
and Aguinis (2016) or Becker et al. (2016) on how to select control variables in empirical 
settings where there is little theoretical guidance from prior research. 
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Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. In total, we had information on 886 
attempts of the sandwich trick. Some variables are correlated, so we checked for 
multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF) when we ran the regression analysis. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Regression Results 
We employed logistic regression analysis because the dependent variable is binary (1 for 
success, 0 otherwise). This allowed us to analyze which variables are associated with an 
increased (or decreased) probability of the trick’s success. Table 2 displays the results. To 
facilitate interpretation, the results are displayed as odds ratios, indicating a higher probability 
of success for values larger than 1. For example, the odds ratio of 1.96 for the late afternoon 
check-in timeslot means that guests checking in at this time and playing the trick are 96 
percent more likely to be successful with the sandwich trick than guest checking in after 8 
p.m. (which is our reference category). 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
As a robustness check, we computed four different models (see Table 2). Model 1 includes 
the motivation-oriented variables only. Model 2 adds the opportunity-related variables and 
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model 3 adds the interaction related-variables which are the ones of primary interest here. 
Ultimately, model 4 includes the control variables.  
Overall, all models exhibit good fit with the data and do not seem to be affected by 
multicollinearity. They also pass the Hosmer–Lemeshow test as Table 2 indicates. Model 4 
delivers the best performance with a McKelvey and Zavoina’s R-squared value of 0.219. The 
mean VIF is 1.39 and the largest single VIF is 2.95. Thus, there is no significant reason to be 
concerned about multicollinearity.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Our analysis produced a number of insightful findings that we have depicted in 
relation to the three dimensions of the fraud triangle model (see Figure 1). First, with regard 
to the variables reflecting the motivation corner of the fraud triangle, the tip size turned out to 
have a small negative significant effect on the success of the trick in the full model. In other 
words, higher bribes did not typically increase the likelihood of the trick’s success. For the 
sake of robustness, we ran an additional analysis from which we excluded one single outlier, 
where the tip—according to the user—was $400.This removed the weak significance of the 
tip size variable, but all other results remained stable in this variant. Additionally, the 
unemployment variable remains non-significant in all specifications, implying that the general 
economic conditions do not affect the trick’s likelihood of success. 
Second, the variables reflecting the opportunity corner of the fraud triangle exhibit 
some interesting effects. Particularly noteworthy are the results in relation to the specificity of 
code of conduct variable. In models 2, 3, and 4–and counter to our intuition–in cases of a 
more specific code of conduct which outlined that receiving small bribes was ethically 
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unacceptable, the likelihood of the trick’s success increased. All odds ratios take values above 
1 and are strongly significant. We also found that the chances of guests’ getting an upgrade by 
means of the trick increased when they checked in between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. (Check-in: Late 
Afternoon/Early Evening = 1.962, p<0.01). This is also indicated by the odds ratios being 
above 1 and strongly significant in all specifications. 
The most important finding, however, relates to the results on the scripted character of 
interactions reflecting the rationalization corner of the fraud triangle. In our study, the 
variables that captured the ritualistic and scripted character of the “sandwich trick” as a social 
interaction between a guest and the hotel receptionist indeed proved to have a strong 
association with the success of the trick. 
Interaction role of the bribe-giver. First, we analyzed whether the trick was performed in its 
conventional variant. That is, whether the request for an upgrade in exchange for a “bribery-
tip” (Azar, 2007) was made covertly by means of the money “sandwich,” or if the money was 
handed to staff openly. Unsurprisingly, the chances of success proved significantly lower in 
cases where the bribe was offered openly (0.377, p<0.05). The odds ratio is significant, but 
takes a value smaller than 1 indicating worse odds. 
Furthermore, our findings show that the kind of information that the hotel guest 
provides to staff when asking for the complimentary upgrade as part of the sandwich trick 
performance seems to make a difference. We compared typical variants of the trick’s 
performance with the standard variant. More precisely, we compared the modes of using 
small talk or making a reference to a special occasion to ask for an upgrade, or handing the tip 
“silently” (i.e., without providing any verbal information that could be regarded either as 
small talk or as an attempt to justify the request for a free upgrade) with the mode of simply 
asking the question “Is there any complimentary room upgrade available?” (or slight 
variations thereof) when handing over the “sandwich.” 
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We found that compared to the standard variant of performing the trick, the likelihood 
of success was increased when the standard question was combined with either small talk 
(9.998, p<0.1) or a reference to a special occasion (3.768, p<0.05). The odds ratios are above 
1 and significant indicating better odds for the small talk and special occasion variants of the 
trick.  Most importantly, however, the likelihood of the trick’s success was also increased 
even when the money was handed “silently” to staff (1.596, p<0.05). The odds ratio is above 
1 and significant. Evidently, in successful cases, hotel staff members were so familiar with the 
“trick” that it was unnecessary for guests to ask explicitly for an upgrade. 
Interaction role of the bribe-receiver. Finally, we examined whether or not the hotel clerk 
understood the implicit meaning of the “sandwich.” As expected, the likelihood of the trick’s 
success significantly decreased in cases where employees explicitly showed that they were 
unfamiliar with the trick (0.152, p<0.01) or placed the money in the open (what we called 
“desk money”), where it would be visible to others, including supervisors (0.407, p<0.01). In 
all these cases the odds rations are below 1 indicating that these variables are associated with 
worse odds of success in our dataset.  
Finally, most of the control variables, i.e. employee age, hotel stars, average room 
price, and number of rooms, did not display a significant association with the trick’s success. 
The exception is our gender congruence dummy where the odds ratio is larger than 1 and 
highly significant (1.770, p<0.01). The results indicate an increased likelihood of receiving a 
complimentary upgrade when guest and hotel employee are of the same gender. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The empirical findings of our study include several indications that the “successful” 
performance of corrupt transactions can be explained by the typified and scripted character of 
the social interaction itself (see also Jancsics, 2013, 2014; Warburton, 2001). First, as our 
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study has shown, offering a larger tip did not increase the success of the “sandwich trick.” 
From this, we can conclude that the sum of $20 is a defining aspect of “bribery-tipping” 
practice, at least in the Las Vegas hotel context. Thus, the sum of $20 seems to serve as a 
constitutive and standardized element of the social interaction that can provide actors with 
orientation in a situation of ethical uncertainty (see Gomez and Jones, 2000; Jagd, 2007). 
Second, the set of variables in our model that relate to the social interaction itself were 
found to be significantly associated with the trick’s chances of success. For example, and 
expectedly, handing the bribe covertly as part of the sandwich, rather than openly proved 
crucial to the successful performance of the practice. Again, this finding can be interpreted as 
supporting evidence for the typified and scripted character of the bribery practice and as an 
indication that the actors seem to perceive the trick at least as ethically questionable. 
Otherwise, there would be no reason to hide the money in form of the “sandwich.” 
Third, in the social interaction, the hotel guests employed communication strategies 
that can be seen as similar to the stigma avoidance strategies identified by Goffman (1963; 
Clair et al., 2005): concealment, passing, or bonding. Interestingly, the success rate of the 
variant that involves handing the tip “silently” (strategy of concealment) proved to yield a 
higher success rate if compared to the reference variant, which involves asking explicitly for a 
complimentary upgrade while handing the money. This non-verbal variant of the “sandwich 
trick” can be seen as the strongest indication of mutual understanding between the actors 
involved in the transaction. Thus, this finding can be interpreted as further evidence that 
“playing the trick” in accordance with the requirements of the social situation (see also 
Morales et al., 2014; Rabl, 2011, 2012) can comparably best explain the “success” of the 
corrupt transaction. 
A final noteworthy finding of our study is that the trick’s “success” rate, counter-
intutively, was positively associated with the specificity of the hotel’s code of conduct 
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regarding small amounts of money offered to staff in exchange for an upgrade and similar 
favors. In this regard, our study is in line with earlier studies that have questioned the 
effectiveness of codes of conduct as a means of managing ethical behavior in organizations 
(see Bondy et al., 2008; Cleek and Leonard, 1998). 
Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
Overall, this study contributes to existing research on corruption by tackling both theoretical 
and methodological shortcomings that tend to be closely intertwined. First, on the theoretical 
level, we have demonstrated that theories of social interactions (e.g., Barley and Tolbert, 
1997; Clair et al., 2005; Goffman, 1963) can be employed fruitfully to explain what 
determines the “success” of corrupt transactions. Importantly, with this theoretical focus, the 
locus of explanation lies neither in the individual nor in structural conditions, but in social 
interactions whose scripted pattern remains largely stable even if the actors change. In this 
respect, our study can be seen as a direct response to recent calls to focus more strongly on 
social-situational (Ashforth et al., 2008; Morales et al., 2014) or relational (Jancics, 2014) 
explanations in corruption research. 
 In the same context, we contribute to the more specific literature on corruption as 
social interaction (e.g., Jancsics, 2013; Warburton, 2001) by showing empirically how 
participants in corrupt transactions tend to employ communication strategies that resemble 
strategies of stigma avoidance (Clair et al., 2005; Goffman, 1963). This finding, in turn, has 
far-reaching implications. We can conclude that through individual actors’ strategic attempts 
(e.g., through strategies of concealment, passing, or bonding) to avoid the stigmatized and the 
sanctionable nature of corrupt transactions, the very existence of these transactions are 
constituted in the first place, that is, by giving form to the typified and scripted character of 
the interaction itself (see Barley and Tolbert, 1997). This conclusion offers fruitful possibili-
ties for further investigating the communicative micro-mechanisms of stigma avoidance and 
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legitimation that can foster the emergence and “normalization” of corrupt transactions over 
time (see also Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein, 2008).  
 Our study can also be seen as an extension to the classical fraud triangle model 
(Cressey, 1953; Morales et al., 2014). In particular, our study suggests shifting the locus of 
explanation for corrupt transactions from the individual-cognitive to the social-interactional 
level. This analytical shift is based on the idea that typified and scripted social interactions 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997) provide individual actors with social forms of rationalization, i.e. 
their sheer existence tends to legitimize themselves (see Gomez and Jones, 2007). 
Importantly, it follows that rationalizations do not solely occur in individual human 
cognitions, but such rationalizations can get manifest and materialized in scripted and 
recognizable patterns of social interactions (see also Warburton, 2001). In this regard, our 
study can pave the way for complementing the classical fraud triangle model with a social-
situational dimension, as called for by Morales et al. (2014, p. 190). More specifically, our 
study suggests that corrupt behavior cannot be fully explained by characteristics of individual 
actors (such as motivation, opportunity, or individual rationalization, as the fraud triangle 
model would suggest), but that institutionalized forms of social interactions (such as the 
“sandwich trick”) and their built-in rationalizations have important explanatory potential, as 
well. Accordingly, we believe that future research will benefit from focusing on a longitudinal 
exploration of such process sequences to understand how rationalizations become integral part 
of a typified social interaction (such as the “sandwich trick”). For instance, we would assume 
that in the initial emergence of an ethically questionable practice, actors will spend significant 
(rhetorical) efforts for explicitly legitimizing the practice (e.g., by framing the “sandwich 
trick” as a “tip” rather than a “bribe”). While in the later stages, those explicit rationalizations 
are not needed anymore as they are substituted by the implicit and built-in rationale of an 
institutionalized, typified, recognizable, and scripted social practice itself.  
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A second contribution of our study relates to the methodological level. In our study, 
we highlighted the empirical value of using online self-reports as a rich data source on 
corruption. Additionally, we demonstrated the usefulness of this approach as a valid 
alternative to indirect and reactive methodologies, such as surveys or interviews. As such, we 
have shown that publicly available online sources such as Frontdesktip.com allow researchers 
to gain valuable insights into instances of corruption on the transaction level (Sequeira, 2012). 
As we have argued, it is hard to study the very affordances constituted by the specific context 
of a social situation (incl. individual actors’ communication strategies) in the artificial settings 
of a lab experiment. Thus, online media creates promising new research opportunities for 
researchers to study the “natural” occurrence of corrupt transactions in an unobtrusive way. 
Limitations and Outlook 
The contributions of our study notwithstanding, we need to consider some important 
limitations, as well. Some limitations are due to the nature of our dataset. For instance, we 
were unable to investigate the motivation and opportunity perceptions of the bribe giver at a 
deeper level as we only observe ‘trick players’ who saw opportunity and were motivated to 
try the trick. Furthermore, the dataset does not allow us to identify the individual users and 
whether their experience over time positively influences the success rate.  
 Other limitations, however, could be mitigated to some extent: First, our data is based 
on self-reported attempts to play the “$20 sandwich trick.” This indicates that our analysis 
may have been affected by a self-selection bias, as not all guests who applied the trick will 
necessarily report it on Frontdesktip.com. Moreover, it is likely that people who tried the trick 
successfully will be more inclined to report their experience. We acknowledge that the base 
rate of success is relatively high. Nevertheless, the sizeable 22 percent of “non-successful” 
self-reports in our dataset limits our concern about a potential self-selection bias. 
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Second, the fact that our main dataset is generated from a publicly available social 
media website may raise concerns with regards to the reliability of the users’ self-reports. 
However, having closely screened the numerical data we have no reason to believe that 
reports are ‘dishonest.’ There was some variance in the tip level reported, including outliers, 
and, as already mentioned, a good amount of failed attempts. We also did not notice any cases 
where users reported the same story various times which would have inflated the number of 
successes or failures reported. However, we acknowledge that the same guest may have 
posted several reports describing different trials in different hotels (thus, becoming more 
“experienced” in applying the trick). Hence, we encourage future researchers studying actual 
cases of corrupt transactions (such as the “$20 Sandwich Trick”) to employ more direct forms 
of empirical investigation (in our case context, a more direct empirical access to the 
phenomenon could be achieved through participant or non-participant observations in hotel 
lobbies in Las Vegas and/or interviews with hotel guests right after check-in). 
Third, given that our analysis was cross-sectional in character, our scope for making 
causal claims is limited. Our results fundamentally provide empirical evidence about a 
number of variables associated with the higher or lower probability of a particular practice 
being applied successfully at a given point in time. Future research should investigate whether 
the same variables impact the success of corrupt practices in a longitudinal setting, as well as 
analyze the respective data qualitatively in more detail.  
Fourth, some of our variables are vulnerable to the same subjectivity bias that, as 
pointed out in the beginning of this article, is one of the limitations of traditional survey-based 
methods. For example, the dummy variable unfamiliarity with the trick reflects the subjective 
assessment of the hotel clerk by the guest; the same applies to further variables such as the 
hotel clerk’s age. Thus, we interpreted those results with some caution. 
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On a final note, we believe that it will be worthwhile for corruption researchers to 
explore further opportunities of data collection as offered by online media (and especially 
social media platforms such as Frontdesktip.com), to enhance our understanding of the role of 
these new platforms in institutionalizing corrupt transactions as typified and scripted social 
interactions across different contexts.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean SD Success Tip Size Unemployment 
Room 
Occupancy 
Peak 
Day 
Check-
in: 
Morning 
Check-in: 
Afternoon 
Check-
in: Late 
Evening 
Check-in: 
Late 
Afternoon/ 
Evening 
Specificity 
of CoC 
Success 0.78 0.41 1 
Tip Size 23.21 17.64 -0.0663* 1 
Unemployment 7.74 3.43 0.0352 0.0919* 1 
Room Occupancy 86.73 5.63 -0.0084 -0.0875* -0.7237* 1 
Peak Day 0.29 0.45 0.0154 0.0071 0.0197 -0.04 1 
Check-in: Morning 0.05 0.22 0.0506 0.0093 0.1206* -0.0685* 0.0186 1 
Check-in: Afternoon 0.07 0.26 0.0158 0.0239 0.1371* -0.1072* -0.0108 -0.0664* 1 
Check-in: Late 
Evening 0.10 0.31 -0.0047 0.0860* 0.1874* -0.1559* 0.0408 -0.0801* -0.0972* 1 
Check-in: Late 
Afternoon/Evening 0.08 0.26 0.0489 0.0218 0.0929* -0.0378 0.0429 -0.0669* -0.0811* -0.0979* 1 
Specificity of CoC 0.28 0.45 0.1370* -0.0536 0.2031* -0.1726* 0.0502 0.0581 0.005 -0.0003 -0.0167 1 
Standard Question 0.77 0.42 -0.1239* 0.024 -0.0483 0.0726* 0.0001 -0.044 0.0298 -0.0001 -0.0294 -0.0542 
Small Talk 0.03 0.18 0.0824* -0.0623 0.0227 -0.0552 -0.0337 0.0141 -0.0039 -0.0009 0.0194 0.0407 
Special Occasion 0.05 0.22 0.0819* 0.0095 0.0241 -0.0434 0.064 0.0182 -0.0041 -0.0431 -0.0447 0.0932* 
Silent Handover 0.14 0.35 0.0556 -0.0029 0.0313 -0.0319 -0.0221 0.0341 -0.031 0.0269 0.0525 -0.0131 
Open Handover 0.04 0.19 -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.0672* 
Unfamiliarity 0.04 0.20 -0.1751* 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Desk Money 0.08 0.28 -0.06 0.03 0.1068* -0.0935* 0.0677* 0.1132* 0.04 -0.01 0.0834* 0.04 
Gender Congruence 0.46 0.50 0.1035* -0.0163 -0.0898* 0.0497 -0.0159 -0.0406 -0.044 -0.0178 -0.0476 0.045 
Employee Age 25.62 6.61 0.0101 -0.0504 0.0359 -0.028 -0.0356 -0.0165 0.0093 -0.0298 0.0779* 0.0840* 
Stars 4 1 0.0573 0.0643 -0.0710* -0.0224 -0.0133 0.0242 -0.0829* 0.0308 0.0097 -0.1396* 
Average Price 69.32 44.53 0.1076* 0.1164* 0.0143 -0.0958* 0.0089 0.0088 -0.0655 0.0426 0.0385 0.1534* 
No. of Rooms 3158 1042 -0.0523 -0.0846* -0.1844* 0.1716* -0.0244 0.0031 0.065 0.0165 0.0547 -0.2875* 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (cont.) 
Variable  
Standard 
Question 
Small 
Talk 
Special 
Occasion 
Silent 
Handover 
 Open 
Handover Unfamiliarity Desk Money 
Gender 
Congruence 
Employee 
Age Stars 
Average 
Price 
No. of 
Rooms 
Standard Question 1 
Small Talk -0.3407* 1 
Special Occasion -0.4183* -0.0415 1 
Silent Handover -0.7611* -0.0756* -0.0928* 1 
Open Handover -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 1 
 
Unfamiliarity 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 1 
Desk Money 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 1 
Gender Congruence 0.0336 0.0099 -0.0064 -0.041 0.0237 0.0015 0.0021 1 
Employee Age -0.0513 -0.0229 0.0178 0.0617 -0.0321 0.001 0.0144 -0.0406 1 
Stars -0.0993* 0.0261 0.0673* 0.0638 -0.0255 -0.0038 0.1523* 0.0566 -0.2140* 1 
Average Price -0.1109* 0.0293 0.1062* 0.0521 -0.0055 0.0241 0.1866* 0.0393 -0.1623* 0.7599* 1 
No. of Rooms -0.0401 0.0127 -0.0253 0.0567 -0.0778* -0.0381 0.033 -0.0087 0.0738* 0.0399 -0.0935* 1 
N=886 
* p<0.05 
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Table 2 
Regression Results 
DV: Success (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
     
Motivation      
 
    
Tip Size 0.992 0.993 0.994 0.990* 
 (0.00550) (0.00643) (0.00582) (0.00566) 
Unemployment 1.030 1.020 1.031 1.049 
 (0.0397) (0.0535) (0.0567) (0.0532) 
     
Opportunity     
 
    
Room Occupancy  1.016 1.024 1.035* 
  (0.0167) (0.0196) (0.0200) 
Peak Day  1.044 1.029 1.050 
  (0.195) (0.214) (0.219) 
Check-in: Morning  1.898 1.922 2.130 
  (0.970) (0.949) (1.070) 
Check-in: Afternoon  1.266 1.242 1.440 
  (0.402) (0.420) (0.472) 
Check-in:  
Late Afternoon/ 
Early Evening 
 
1.790** 1.963*** 1.962*** 
  (0.468) (0.463) (0.487) 
Specificity of Code of 
Conduct 
 
2.272** 2.496** 2.083* 
  (0.911) (0.965) (0.849) 
     
Rationalization through 
the Social Interaction 
    
     
   Bribe-giver     
     
Open handover   0.387** 0.377** 
   (0.173) (0.165) 
Small talk (bonding)    9.410** 9.998* 
   (10.27) (11.77) 
Special occasion (passing)    4.171*** 3.768** 
   (2.190) (2.077) 
Silent handover 
(concealment)  
  1.594** 
(0.346) 
1.596** 
(0.337) 
     
  Bribe-receiver     
     
Unfamiliarity   0.168*** 0.152*** 
   (0.0630) (0.0585) 
Desk Money   0.495*** 0.407*** 
   (0.0733) (0.0786) 
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Controls     
 
    
Gender Congruence    1.770*** 
    (0.290) 
Employee Age    1.004 
    (0.0156) 
Stars    0.988 
    (0.416) 
Average Price    1.007 
    (0.00558) 
No. of rooms    1.000 
    (0.000219) 
     
Constant 3.431*** 0.670 0.314 0.0763 
 (1.429) (1.188) (0.634) (0.213) 
     
Observations 886 886 886 886 
McKelvey & Zavoina R2 0.009 0.059 0.175 0.219 
     
Hosmer–Lemeshow   2.45 2.23 4.61 7.06 
chi2(8)  
Prob > chi2 
0.9641 0.9730 0.7979 0.5297 
     
Mean VIF 1.01 1.31 1.20 1.39 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses, coefficients are displayed as odds ratios 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; stigma avoidance strategies annotated in italics 
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Figure 1 
Social-Situational Fraud Triangle Model,  
Operationalization, and Key Findings 
 
 
(bold text = significant; +/- direction of odds ratios) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Our focus on Erving Goffman’s sociology of social interactions also has a particular fit to the empirical context 
of our study, i.e. the Las Vegas hotels and casino business. This is because, in addition to his very prolific 
academic career, Goffman used to work as a blackjack dealer and later as a pit boss at the Station Plaza Casino 
in Las Vegas, Nevada (see Fine and Manning, 2003, p. 36). Hence, figuratively speaking, our study allows 
Goffman to “return” to the Las Vegas hotel and casino context that he had also studied in (auto-)ethnographic 
form (Goffman, 1969). 
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